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Trial Practice and Procedure
by John O'Shea Sullivan*
Ashby K. Fox*
and Tala Amirfazli***
The 2015 survey period yielded noteworthy decisions relating to
federal trial practice and procedure in the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,' several of which involved issues of
first impression. This Article analyzes recent developments in the
Eleventh Circuit, including significant rulings in the areas of arbitration,
appellate practice, civil procedure, and statutory interpretation.
I.

ARBITRATION

A. Whether the Waiver of Right to Compel Named Plaintiffs' Claims
to Arbitration in a Putative Class Action Should be Extended to
Unnamed Putative Class Members' Claims
In Larsen v. Citibank FSB (In re Checking Account Overdraft
Litigation),2 the Eleventh Circuit held that a district court lacked

* Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B.J., 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992).
Member, Mercer Law Review (1993-1994); Managing Editor (1994-1995). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and North Carolina.
** Partner in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt University
(B.A., magna cum laude, 2000) (Phi Beta Kappa); Emory University School of Law (J.D.,
with honors, 2003). Member, Emory International Law Review (2001-2002); Notes and
Comments Editor (2002-2003). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Burr & Forman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.A., cum laude, 2010); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., with
honors, 2013). Member, Georgia State Law Review (2011-2013); Legislative Editor (20122013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of trial practice during the prior survey period, see John O'Shea
Sullivan, Ashby K. Fox & Tala Amirfazli, Trial Practice and Procedure, Eleventh Circuit
Survey, 66 MERCER L. REV. 1045 (2015).
2. 780 F.3d 1031 (11th Cir. 2015).

975

976

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

jurisdiction to decide that a bank's waiver of its right to compel
arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims in a putative class action
should be extended to preclude the bank from compelling arbitration of
the unnamed putative class members' claims.' Larsen arose out of five
putative class actions filed against Wells Fargo, N.A. and its predecessor,
Wachovia Bank, N.A., alleging the banks unlawfully charged them
overdraft fees in their checking accounts.' The customer agreements
governing the subject checking accounts contained provisions for
submitting any dispute arising out of a customer's checking account to
binding arbitration.'
In a related action arising out of the same facts, Garcia v. Wachovia
Corp.,6 the Eleventh Circuit held that Wells Fargo 7 waived its right to
compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims in the subject class
actions (the Class Actions).' As explained in more detail in Garcia,
when the plaintiffs in the Class Actions filed their actions in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, despite being
prompted on two separate occasions to file its motion to compel
arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims,' Wells Fargo failed to move

3. Id. at 1034.
4. Id. at 1033-34.
5. Id. at 1034. The Wells Fargo agreements stated:
"[E]ither [the customer] or the Bank may require the submission of a dispute to
binding arbitration at any reasonable time notwithstanding that a lawsuit or other
proceeding has been commenced," but that neither a customer nor the bank may
consolidate disputes or "include in any arbitration any dispute as a representative
or member of a class."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Garcia v. Wachovia Corp., 699 F.3d 1273, 1275-76 (11th
Cir. 2012)). Likewise, the Wachovia agreements stated: "if either the customer or the bank
requests, 'any dispute or claim concerning [the customer's] account or [the customer's]
relationship to [Wachovial will be decided by binding arbitration,' and that the arbitration
'will be brought individually and not as part of a class action.'" Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Garcia, 699 F.3d at 1275-76).
6. 699 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2012).
7. Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo in January 2009, so both banks are referred
to herein as Wells Fargo unless the context requires otherwise. Larsen, 780 F.3d at 1033
n. 1.
8. Id. at 1033; see also Garcia, 699 F.3d at 1275-76.
9. Larsen, 780 F.3d at 1034-35. In November 2009, the district court in Garcia ordered,
among other things, that Wells Fargo file any motions to compel arbitration by December
8, 2009. Id. at 1034. Despite this deadline, Wells Fargo did not file a motion to compel
arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims, and instead joined other banks in filing an
omnibus motion to dismiss in similar overdraft class actions. Id. at 1034-35; see also In re
Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2010). After
entry of the order denying the omnibus motion to dismiss on March 11, 2010, the district
court again prompted Wells Fargo, among other banks, to file any necessary motions to
compel arbitration of plaintiffs' claims by April 19, 2010. Larsen, 780 F.3d at 1034-35.
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to compel arbitration.o However, after a favorable ruling from the
United States Supreme Court,n Wells Fargo promptly moved to compel
arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims in the Class Actions, despite
having actively litigated the Class Actions during the previous year.' 2
The district court in Garciadenied the motion and held that Wells Fargo
had waived its right to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claims
by failing to file a timely motion to compel arbitration, and the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed."
On remand, while the named plaintiffs were moving for class
certification, Wells Fargo filed conditional motions to dismiss the claims
of the unnamed or absent class members in favor of arbitration in the
event the district court certified a class. 4 Wells Fargo was essentially
notifying the court that it intended to move to compel arbitration for all

Wells Fargo again failed to file a motion to compel arbitration. Id. Instead, Wells Fargo
filed a statement "reserving its right to compel arbitration against any plaintiffs 'who
[might] later join, individually or as putative class members, in this litigation,'" purportedly attempting to clarify that its "arbitration rights as to a nationwide class, for newly added
plaintiffs, and/or for plaintiffs from newly added states are not yet at issue." Id. at 1035
(alterations in original).
10. Id. The plaintiffs in the class actions "hailed from states that took a dim view of
arbitration agreements containing provisions barring class arbitration." Id. at 1034 n.2.
Thus, because the subject agreements included such provisions, Wells Fargo believed that
filing motions to compel arbitration of the named plaintiffs' claim would be futile. Id.
11. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336, 352 (2011). In
Concepcion, the United States Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) "preempts state-law rules voiding consumer arbitration agreements
that bar classwide arbitration procedures." Larsen, 780 F.3d at 1035.
12. Id. After choosing not to move to compel arbitration by April 19, 2010, Wells Fargo
filed its answers to the five Class Actions together with a notice that "it was reserving its
right to arbitrate the claims of any future plaintiffs." Id. Specifically, Wells Fargo's notice
stated, "Absent members of the putative classes have a contractual obligation to arbitrate
any claims they have against Wells Fargo." Id. Thereafter, Wells Fargo proceeded with
discovery and motions practice in preparation for the fight over class certification and for
trial. Id.
13. Id. Specifically, the district court in Garciafound "Wells Fargo had waived its right
to compel arbitration vis-&-vis the named plaintiffs by failing to timely move to compel
arbitration." Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that "a motion to compel
arbitration would not have been futile prior to Concepcion and that Wells Fargo had
'waived its right to compel arbitration of claims brought by its customer as putative class
action plaintiffs.'" Id. (quoting Garcia, 699 F.3d at 1275).
14. Id. Wells Fargo also filed responses in opposition to the named plaintiffs' motion
for class certification. Id. In Wells Fargo's opposition, Wells Fargo argued, among other
things, "that the court should not certify a class due to lack of numerosity" because "all
customers with enforceable arbitration obligations would have to be excluded from the
class, and that because all of Wells Fargo's customers had signed agreements containing
arbitration provisions, there would not be enough class members to make a class action
viable." Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).
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of the claims of the unnamed class members.15 The district court
denied Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss, finding the court
lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the putative class members'
claims were subject to arbitration and Wells Fargo lacked standing to
obtain an order declaring the unnamed members' claims were subject to
arbitration.16 Wells Fargo appealed."
The Eleventh Circuit held that "because a class including the
unnamed putative class members had not been certified, Article III's
jurisdictional limitations precluded the District Court from entertaining
Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss those members' claims as
subject to arbitration.""s In determining the district court's jurisdictional limits, the Eleventh Circuit explained, "Because a class had not
been certified at the time Wells Fargo moved conditionally to compel
arbitration of the claims of all unnamed class members, those unnamed

15.

In its conditional motions to dismiss, Wells Fargo stated in relevant part as follows:

While the Absent Class Members are not yet part of this litigation, and are
therefore not currently subject to this Court's jurisdiction, this will change if this
Court certifies one or more classes in response to plaintiffs' pending motion for
class certification. Wells Fargo accordingly makes this arbitration motion at this
time so that if the Court does certify one or more classes in these cases, it can
address the arbitration obligation of the Absent Class Members at the first
possible moment. If the Court declines to certify any class . . ., this arbitration
motion will be moot.
Larsen, 780 F.3d at 1035 n.5 (alteration in original).
16. Specifically, the district court explained as follows:
In [these] cases, the Court's jurisdiction was fixed on the day the original
complaints were filed. The Court had jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs and
over anyone else who might ultimately be held to be a member of that class
through a successful Motion to Certify Class. Should the Court certify a class in
one of more of these cases, then the class will be fixed with a definition. Should
the Court rule against certifying a class, then no class would exist. Regardless of
the outcome of the upcoming hearing on class certification, there cannot be "absent
class members," now or after this Court has ruled on class certification.
Even accepting as true that there exist so-called absent class members in these
cases, Defendant has a problem with standing. If the group against which
Defendant seeks to assert a right to arbitration is not yet part of the class and
thus not subject to the earlier ruling that Defendant has waived its arbitration
rights, then that group has not yet brought a claim against Defendant. Therefore,
Defendant lacks standing to assert anything against them. Simple logic dictates
that the Court must deny these motions.
Id. at 1036 (alteration in original) (quoting the district court's reasoning).
17. Id. at 1035-36. Wells Fargo had filed a motion for clarification asking the district
court to clarify whether it had denied the conditional motions to dismiss without prejudice
and whether it had denied the motions as premature. The court denied Wells Fargo's
motion for clarification without comment. Id.
18. Id. at 1036-37.
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individuals necessarily remained putative participants in the case."' 9
The court further explained that, "[albsent class certification, there is no
justiciable controversy between Wells Fargo and the unnamed putative
class members" because "any claims that they might have against Wells
Fargo necessarily exist only by hypothesis."20 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that "the District Court's pronouncement
purporting to definitively foreclose the arbitration of the hypothetical
claims that might be raised in the future by hypothetical plaintiffs
cannot be regarded as anything but an impermissible 'advisory opinion
on an abstract proposition of law."'
The court further held the result was the same for the plaintiffs.2 2
Because the named plaintiffs sought to defend the district court's denial
of the conditional motions to dismiss, the Eleventh Circuit held that "the
named plaintiffs lack Article III standing to seek our affirmance of the
District Court's provisional holding that if a class is certified, Wells
Fargo will be estopped to assert its contractual rights to arbitration."2 3
The Eleventh Circuit explained that "the named plaintiffs have no
cognizable stake in the outcome" of whether Wells Fargo can compel
arbitration of the unnamed class members' claims because the named
plaintiffs already received a favorable ruling in Garcia regarding

19. Id. at 1037. The Eleventh Circuit relied on its prior holdings detailing Article III
of the United States Constitution's limits on a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Id.; see SEC v. Quest Energy Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 768 F.3d 1106, 1108 (11th Cir. 2014)
("Article III of the Constitution of the United States limits the subject matter jurisdiction
of federal courts to'Cases' and 'Controversies.'"); Wendy's Intl, Inc. v. City of Birmingham,
868 F.2d 433, 436 (11th Cir. 1989); see also Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 48 (1969).
20. Larsen, 730 F.3d at 1037. The court cited to various cases supporting the principle
that an unnamed putative class member is not a party to the class action litigation unless
and until the class has been certified because "[clertification of a class is the critical act
which reifies the unnamed class members and, critically, renders them subject to the
court's power." Id.
21. Id. (quoting Hall, 396 U.S. at 48).
22. Id.
23. Id. The court noted that although the named plaintiffs admitted that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the putative class members could be
compelled to arbitrate their claims against Wells Fargo prior to class certification, the
named plaintiffs sought to defend the district court's denial of Wells Fargo's conditional
motions to dismiss as "a non-mutual collateral estoppel holding that Wells Fargo waived
its right to compel the unnamed putative class members to arbitrate their claims." Id. at
1038. The named plaintiffs further argued that "Wells Fargo is estopped ...
from
compelling unnamed putative class members to arbitrate their claims because Garcia
definitively held that Wells Fargo had waived its arbitration rights as to the named
plaintiffs." Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained, however, that this argument "flounders
before leaving port" because "the named plaintiffs lack standing to advance [the argument]
on behalf of the unnamed putative class members." Id.
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whether Wells Fargo waived its rights to compel arbitration against
them.24 The Eleventh Circuit thus vacated the district court's order
denying Wells Fargo's conditional motions to dismiss, thereby reaffirming the well-established rules regarding a federal court's subject matter
jurisdiction and a party's standing to raise arguments on behalf of third
parties.25
B. Whether a PlaintiffProperly Challenges an ArbitrationAgreement's Validity When He or She Does Not Specifically Challenge the
Delegation Provisionof the ArbitrationAgreement
In Parnell v. CashCall, Inc.,26 the Eleventh Circuit held that when
a plaintiff seeks to challenge an arbitration agreement containing a
delegation provision, the plaintiff must challenge the delegation
provision directly." The dispute over arbitration in Parnellarose after
the defendant (CashCall) removed the case to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia and moved to compel
arbitration in accordance with the parties' agreement. The plaintiff
(Parnell) had executed a loan agreement containing an arbitration

24. Id. at 1039. The court noted that as a practical matter, whether Wells Fargo could
compel the unnamed class members to arbitrate their claims "may be highly relevant to
the named plaintiffs, given that the answer to that question may effectively decide the
viability of their class action as such." Id. at 1039 n.10. However, the court explained that
"[this] issue is properly litigated via a motion to certify a class, not in defense of a decision
the District Court had no jurisdiction to make." Id.
25. Id. at 1039. Reaffirming a party's "fundamental prerequisite for standing," the
Eleventh Circuit cited the Supreme Court's plurality holding in Singleton v. Wulff, 423 U.S.
106 (1976), to reinforce two reasons for the "prudential principle" that a federal court "must
hesitate before resolving a controversy, even one within their constitutional power to
resolve, on the basis of the rights of third persons not parties to the litigation." Larsen, 780
F.3d at 1038 (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 113). First, the third persons may not wish
to assert their rights, and second, the third persons are the best proponents of their own
rights. Id. The court acknowledged that "[t]he rule is not absolute" because "if the party
asserting the right has a close relationship with the person who actually possesses the
right, and if the possessor of the right is somehow hindered in his ability to protect his own
interests, then courts may grant a third party standing." Id. In the case at bar, however,
the court found that unnamed plaintiffs "fail to come within this exception to the general
rule against third-party standing." Id. at 1039. The court noted, "Even if we assume that
the named plaintiffs have a sufficiently close relationship with the unnamed putative class
members to assert rights on their behalf, the named plaintiffs have not explained how the
unnamed putative class members would be hindered in their ability to assert their own
rights." Id. Further, the court was unable to point to any reason why the unnamed class
members would be somehow precluded from challenging Wells Fargo's attempt to enforce
the arbitration provisions in the account agreements on their own accord if and when they
become a part of the class action. Id.
26. 804 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2015).
27. Id. at 1144.
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provision.28 The district court denied CashCall's motion to compel
arbitration, holding that "Parnell articulated a challenge to the
arbitration provision in the parties' contract" and "the arbitration
provision was unconscionable."2 9 CashCall appealed, arguing that,
because the arbitration provision contains a delegation provision and
because Parnell did not articulate a challenge to the delegation provision
specifically, the district court should have granted its motion to compel
arbitration and allowed the arbitrator to determine whether the loan
agreement's arbitration provision is unenforceable."
The Eleventh Circuit agreed and reversed, noting that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)"' requires courts to "treat the delegation provision as valid, enforce the terms of the Loan Agreement, and leave to the
arbitrator the determination of whether the Loan Agreement's arbitration provision is enforceable."" The court explained that because
"parties may agree to commit . . . threshold determinations to an
arbitrator, such as whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable," the
FAA prevents federal courts from reviewing a plaintiff's challenge to the
arbitration agreement as a whole when the arbitration agreement
contains a delegation provision and the plaintiff fails to challenge the
delegation provision specifically." The Eleventh Circuit relied heavily
on the United States Supreme Court's holding in Rent-A-Center v.
Jackson3 to hold that "absent a challenge to the delegation provision
itself, the federal courts must treat the delegation provision 'as valid
under § 2, and must enforce it under §§ 3 and 4 [of the FAA], leaving
any challenge to the validity of the Agreement as a whole for the
arbitrator.'

3

28. Id. at 1145.
29. Id. at 1145-46.
30. Id. at 1144, 1146.
31. 9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2012).
32. Parnell, 804 F.3d at 1145.
33. Id. at 1146. The FAA governed the subject loan agreement, and as such, section
2 of the FAA "requires the courts to enforce an arbitration provision within a contract
unless 'such grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."' Id.
(quoting Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67-68 (2010)). Further, section
4 of the FAA "permits one party to seek the assistance of the district court when the other
party refuses to proceed with arbitration, and requires the court to 'make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreenlent.'
Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4).
34. 561 U.S. 63 (2010).
35. Parnell, 804 F.3d at 1146-47 (quoting Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 72).

982

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Further, the Eleventh Circuit, relying on Georgia law of contract
interpretation3 6 and "remaining cognizant of the requirement that a
contractual commitment to arbitrate arbitrability must be 'clear and unmistakable,"' held that the loan agreement contains an express
delegation provision that "conveys the parties' intent to submit to an
arbitrator the threshold issue of arbitrability., 7
The arbitration
agreement expressly stated that a "[d]ispute includes 'any issues
concerning the validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or the
Arbitration agreement.""'
The court explained that even though the
delegation provision was "contained within a sub-provision," the
language of the delegation provision "unambiguously commits to the
arbitrator the power to determine the enforceability of the agreement to
arbitrate.""
Next, relying on the Supreme Court's analysis in Rent-A-Center, the
Eleventh Circuit explained that because the loan agreement contained

36. The court explained that "[w]hen federal courts interpret arbitration agreements,
state contract law governs and directs the courts' analyses of whether the parties
committed an issue to arbitration," because "[clourts should not assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence that they
did so." Id. at 1147 (alterations in original) (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan,
514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995)). Although the loan agreement expressly provided that the laws
of the Cheyenne River Tribe governed the loan agreement, the parties did not provide the
district court with any applicable tribal laws regarding contract interpretation, and the
district court was unable to uncover any. Id. Accordingly, the district court looked to
Georgia law regarding contract interpretation. Id. Under Georgia law, "If the language
of the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation,
that interpretation must control, and no construction of the contract is required or even
permissible." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Decatur v. DeKalb Cnty., 289 Ga.
612, 614, 713 S.E.2d 846, 849 (2011)).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1148 (emphasis omitted). The court explained that "[t]he delegation provision
appears in the third sub-paragraph of the Loan Agreement's arbitration provision" and
"[t]he portion of the Loan Agreement titled 'Arbitration Defined' commits all 'Disputes' to
arbitration." Id. at 1147-48 (emphasis omitted).
39. Id. at 1148. On appeal, Parnell argued that there is no delegation provision in the
arbitration agreement because the language "appears within a string citation of examples."
Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "there is no requirement that a
delegation provision be offset from other contractual language or solely discuss arbitration
of arbitrability in order to be valid." Id. The court further explained that the Loan
Agreement "requires that all Disputes be resolved in arbitration, with Disputes construed
broadly, and ... specifically defines Disputes to include at least 'issue[s] concerning the
validity, enforceability, or scope of this loan or the Arbitration agreement,' regardless of
what other matters may also constitute a Dispute." Id. (alterations in original). In sum,
"the Loan Agreement contains a delegation provision, providing clear and unmistakable
evidence that the parties intended to commit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitrator."
Id.
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a delegation provision, the court would retain jurisdiction only "to review
a challenge to that particular provision" and "[a]bsent a direct challenge,
[the court] must treat the delegation provision as valid and allow the
arbitrator to determine the issue of arbitrability." 4 0 The court reasoned
that, as with the plaintiff's allegations in Rent-A-Center, all of Parnell's
allegations "address the validity of the underlying agreement" and "[alt
no point in his complaint does Parnell specifically challenge the parties'
agreement to commit to arbitrationthe question of the enforceability of
the arbitration agreement." 4 1 Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit confirmed the well-established principle that if a plaintiff wishes to
challenge an arbitration agreement containing a delegation provision, he
or she must challenge the delegation provision directly. 42 Otherwise,
courts are obligated to find the arbitration agreement is valid and
enforce the agreement according to its terms.
II.

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND APPELLATE PRACTICE

A. When May an Appellant Assert a New Issue or Theory Not Raised
in the Opening Brief?
In an en banc decision addressing a time-honored appellate rule, the
Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Durham 44 overturned its "longstanding case law rule," which held that an appellant who fails to raise
an issue in his opening brief may not do so in a reply brief, supplemental
brief, re-hearing petition, or on remand from the Supreme Court, even

40. Id. In Rent-A-Center, the plaintiff filed a discrimination suit against his former
employer, who then moved to compel arbitration based on the signed employment
agreement. Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 73). In his opposition to the employer's
motion to compel, the plaintiff argued "the entire agreement seems drawn to provide RentA-Center with undue advantages should an employment-related dispute arise" and that
"the arbitrationagreement as a whole is substantively unconscionable." Id. (quoting RentA-Center, 561 U.S. at 73). The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that because the
arbitration agreement contained a delegation provision giving the arbitrator the exclusive
power to resolve disputes relating to the enforceability of the arbitration agreement and
because the plaintiff only challenged the arbitration agreement as a whole, the Court was
obligated to enforce the arbitration agreement based on its clear terms in accordance with
the FAA. Id. (citing Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. 71-72).
41. Id. at 1149. In his complaint, Parnell alleged, among other things "that the Loan
Agreement contains an arbitration provision that violates substantive Georgia law" and
"[tihe Loan Agreement is unconscionable." Id. at 1148-49 (alteration in original).
42. Id. at 1149.
43. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also granted Parnell the ability to seek leave of the
district court to amend his complaint "to reflect a proper challenge to the delegation
provision." Id.
44. 795 F.3d 1329 (11th Cir. 2015).
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if the issue is based on an intervening decision of the Supreme Court.4 5
The Eleventh Circuit pivoted to hold: "Where precedent that is binding
in this circuit is overturned by an intervening decision of the Supreme
Court, we will permit an appellant to raise in a timely fashion thereafter
an issue or theory based on that new decision while his direct appeal is
still pending in this Court." 4 6

In Durham, the appellant (Wayne Durham) was convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession with intent to
distribute cocaine. 47 At sentencing, Durham was found to be an
"Armed Career Criminal" under the Armed Career Criminal Act
(ACCA), ' and was sentenced to 288 months imprisonment.
In his
opening brief, Durham challenged his sentence as unreasonable but
failed to raise any issue regarding whether the ACCA applied to him.o
In January 2015, two months after Durham's opening brief was filed,
the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States" ordered
re-argument and supplemental briefing on the issue of whether the
residual clause of the ACCA" was unconstitutionally vague." In
March 2015, Durham filed a motion to stay his appeal pending the
decision in Johnson and for permission to file a supplemental brief after
the Supreme Court issued its decision in Johnson." Durham contended that if the Supreme Court in Johnson were to find the ACCA's
residual clause to be unconstitutional, only two of his prior convictions
would qualify as violent felonies, and thus, the ACCA should not have
been applied to him.
In June 2015, the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Johnson, finding the residual clause of the ACCA to be
unconstitutionally vague. 6
Without reaching the merits of the application of the ACCA, the
Eleventh Circuit granted hearing en banc to decide whether it should
"overturn its precedent barring an appellant from asserting an issue that
was not raised in his opening brief where the issue is based on an

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 1330.
Id.
Id. at 1329-30.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012).
Durham, 795 F.3d at 1330.
Id. Durham's opening brief to the Eleventh Circuit was filed in November 2014.

Id.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

35 S. Ct. 939 (2015).
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Durham, 795 F.3d at 1330.
Id.
Id.
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
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intervening Supreme Court decision that changes the law."" In
overturning this "longstanding case law rule," the court noted that
"every other circuit has decided that the reasons against having the rule
outweigh those that favor it, at least where the Supreme Court 'issues
a decision that upsets precedent relevant to a pending case and therefore
provides an appellant with a new theory or claim.""' Accordingly, the
court held as follows:
[W]here there is an intervening decision of the Supreme Court on an
issue that overrules either a decision of that Court or a published
decision of this Court that was on the books when the appellant's
opening brief was filed, and that provides the appellant with a new
claim or theory, the appellant will be allowed to raise that new claim
or theory in a supplemental or substitute brief provided that he files
a motion to do so in a timely fashion after (or, as in this case, before)
the new decision is issued."

'

The court limited this "new rule" to "all direct appeals currently pending
before us that involve an intervening Supreme Court decision and in all
future direct appeals that do."6 0 The court granted Durham's motion
to file a supplemental brief and set a supplemental briefing schedule for
the parties to argue the effect, if any, of the decision in Johnson on the
validity of Durham's sentence.6

57. Durham, 795 F.3d at 1330.
58. Id. at 1330, 1331 (quoting Joseph v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 705, 706 (2014)).
59. Id. at 1331.
60. Id.
The change in circuit law that our holding makes is enough to decide the question
presented by the motion before us, and that is as far as our holding goes. We
leave our circuit law intact insofar as cases that are no longer pending on direct
appeal are concerned, insofar as any issue that was not previously foreclosed by
binding precedent is concerned, and insofar as any issue based on a Supreme
Court decision that was issued soon enough, as a practical matter, for it to have
been included in the opening brief is concerned. And nothing in this decision
loosens the strictures of the plain error rule, or affects the force of any appeal
waiver agreed to in the district court. The only rule affected is the rule concerning
the effect of a failure to raise a claim or theory in the opening brief that a party
files where that claim or theory is based on an intervening Supreme Court
decision.
Id.
61. Id. Although the court in Durham stated that it granted Durham's motion to file
a supplemental brief "on the cdnstitutionality of the ACCA's residual clause," given that
this issue had been resolved by the Supreme Court in Johnson at that time, it appears that
Durham's motion, and the subject matter of the supplemental briefing allowed in light of
the same, actually may have pertained to the application of the ACCA to Durham in light
of the facts relating to Durham's convictions and the Supreme Court's findings in Johnson.
Id.
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B. Whether a Sua Sponte Award of Monetary Sanctions Against a
Non-Party Was an Abuse of Discretion
In Sciarretta v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co.," the Eleventh
Circuit upheld a substantial award of sanctions imposed by the District
Court for the Southern District of Florida against non-party Imperial
Premium Finance, LLC, (Imperial), which the district court awarded sua
sponte pursuant to its inherent authority upon finding that Imperial had
acted in bad faith by selectively preparing a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6)6 3 witness to give only self-serving testimony.6 4
Although Imperial was not a party to the Sciarrettalawsuit, Imperial's
"unsavory business practices" gave rise to the dispute." Imperial's
business involved stranger-oriented life insurance (STOLI) policies,
which are speculative investment devices that frequently exploit the
elderly.6 6 In a STOLI scheme, a speculator enters into an agreement
with a (typically elderly) person, who authorizes the speculator to buy
insurance on his or her life." The speculator buys the policy in the
largest amount possible and pays the premiums, hoping to make money
if: (1) the insured dies before the premiums paid exceed the death
benefit, or (2) the speculator sells the policy to another speculator for
more than the premiums paid at the time of sale."
Although Imperial did not buy STOLI policies directly, it provided
financing for life insurance premiums through loans to prospective
insureds." The structure of Imperial's loans made them "a sure bet
with nothing but upside"-if the insured paid off the loans when due,
Imperial received all of its fees and interest and walked away with a
substantial return on investment in two years; if the insured died before
the loan matured, the loan terms allowed Imperial to collect its unpaid
principal, fees, and interest out of the policy proceeds; if the insured
defaulted and Imperial foreclosed (which happened more often than not
due to Imperial's unfavorable loan terms), Imperial could collect all of its
interest and fees, plus the full policy benefit at the time of the insured's
death.o

62. 778 F.3d 1205 (11th Cir. 2015).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
64. 778 F.3d at 1207, 1214.
65. Id. at 1207-09.
66. Id. at 1207-08.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1208.
70. Id. "The typical [Imperial] loan had a term of two years, a relatively high floating
interest rate, and 'substantial' origination fees, all of which made the borrower more likely
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Imperial sought to evade anti-STOLI state laws requiring purchasers
of insurance policies to have an insurable interest in the insured's life 7
by drafting its loan agreements to require the financed policies be held
in trust (with a trustee chosen by Imperial) for the benefit of the
insured's relatives during the term of the loan. 7 2 Imperial also "assisted" prospective insureds in filling out their insurance applications,
wherein the insureds would falsely state they were not seeking premium
financing to mislead insurers who required such a disclosure to avoid
issuing policies that would be used in STOLI schemes." This fraudulent behavior prompted a criminal investigation into Imperial's business
in 2011, which ultimately resulted in an April 2012 non-prosecution
agreement wherein Imperial paid an $8 million fine and fired various
implicated employees in exchange for not being criminally prosecuted."
The dispute in Sciarretta arose during the criminal investigation of
Imperial's business. Prospective insured Barton Cotton met with an
Imperial employee about buying a multi-million dollar life insurance
Consistent with
policy and financing the premium payments.
Imperial's standard practice of evading state insurable-interest laws,
Cotton and an irrevocable trust in his name, with Cotton's wife and
children as the beneficiaries of the trust, applied for the $8 million life
insurance policy with Lincoln National Life Insurance Company.76 Also
consistent with Imperial's practices, Cotton falsely stated on his
insurance application he was not buying the policy for resale and he
would not use a third party to finance the premium payments.77 Not
realizing this was a STOLI scheme, Lincoln issued a $5 million policy to
Cotton, which became an asset of Cotton's trust." Unbeknownst to

to default." Id.
71. See ALA. CODE § 27-14-3(f) (LexisNexis 2014) (requiring an insurable interest (in
the insured's life) at the time a policy becomes effective); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.404(1)
(West 2011) (requiring a person purchasing insurance on "the life or body of another
individual" to have "an insurable interest in the individual insured"); O.C.G.A. § 33-24-3(h)
(2013) (requiring an insurable interest (in the insured's life) at the time a policy becomes
effective). But see TEX. INS. CODE § 1103.056 (allowing any person, including a corporation,
to purchase insurance on any other person's life so long as the insured consents in writing).
72. Sciarretta, 778 F.3d at 1208.
73. Id. at 1209.
74. Id. at 1208, 1209.
75. Id. at 1209.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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Lincoln, the trust financed the premium payments with a loan from
Imperial."
Approximately two years after the policy was issued, Cotton was
diagnosed with cancer and died two months after the Imperial loan
matured. 0 At the time of Cotton's death, the trust had not paid off the
loan, but Imperial had not yet foreclosed on it (in fact, Imperial had
begun marketing the loan for resale upon learning of Cotton's diagnosis),
which left Cotton's trust as the record owner of the policy."'
After learning of Cotton's death, Lincoln investigated and learned that
Imperial had financed the purchase of the policy to market it under a
STOLI scheme.8 2 Determining that Imperial's scheme constituted
fraud in the procurement of the policy, Lincoln refused to pay the death
benefit to the trustee. In April 2011 (while the criminal investigation
into Imperial's business was underway), the trustee (Sciarretta) sued
Lincoln for the death benefit, and Lincoln counterclaimed for fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy." Imperial was not
a party to the case, although Imperial's outside counsel represented the
trust in the lawsuit.8 5

During discovery, Lincoln sought to depose a corporate representative
of Imperial under Rule 30(b)(6). 8 6 Because Imperial knew it was under
criminal investigation, and because the topics in Lincoln's deposition
subpoena related to the criminal investigation, all of Imperial's
employees invoked the Fifth Amendment and refused to testify in the
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition." Thus, Imperial asked the district court

79. Id.
As usual, Imperial's premium financing loan had a floating interest rate between
11.5% and 16%, and the loan agreement authorized it to foreclose on Cotton's
policy and become its owner if the trust didn't repay the loan by its maturity date.
Because of the high interest rate and an 'origination fee' of nearly $112,000, after
less than two years Imperial's $335,000 loan to the Cotton trust had ballooned to
more than $557,000.

Id.
80. Id. at 1209-10. "Cotton's bad news was good news for Imperial because the value
of a STOLI policy varies inversely with the life expectancy of the insured." Id.
81. Id. at 1210.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Imperial also made a second loan to the trust to cover its litigation expenses
in the Sciarretta case. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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either for a stay of its deposition or permission to use an outside witness
to testify as a designated corporate representative."
The district court granted the latter request, and Imperial hired
independent economist and testifying expert John Norris to serve as its
Rule 30(b)(6) representative in Lincoln." None of Imperial's employees
would speak with Norris in light of the ongoing criminal investigation,
so Norris's deposition preparation was comprised solely of conversations
with Imperial's outside counsel and one lawyer in its general counsel's
office about Imperial's knowledge of the topics identified in the subpoena,9 0 a review of approximately 20,000 pages of documents provided by
Imperial, and some "slight Googling of Imperial" where he found some
"general background information" about the company."
During Norris's 30(b)(6) deposition, he was frequently unable to
answer questions on the topics identified in the subpoena because
Imperial had not briefed him on those topics. 9 2 Lincoln later subpoenaed Imperial to testify at trial with topics in the trial subpoena
identical to those in the 30(b)(6) deposition subpoena.9 3 In preparation
for his trial testimony, Norris reviewed his deposition transcript but did
not seek additional information about those topics on which he had
lacked information during his deposition." Imperial's outside counsel,
who was responsible for educating Norris on the subject matters for
testimony, did not ask Norris to obtain any additional knowledge in
preparation for his testimony at trial." At trial, Norris was again
unable to answer numerous questions about the subject matters for
which he had been designated.9 6 Norris admitted he had done nothing
to further his understanding of these topics, nor had he done anything
to seek further clarification about the same questions he had been
unable to answer during his deposition.9 7

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Imperial's outside counsel billed seventy-two hours of attorney time and fiftysix hours of paralegal time in preparing Norris to testify at deposition. Id. at 1210 n.3.
Norris himself billed fifty hours of time for preparation and attendance at the deposition.
Id. Norris stated that he used that time to review the subpoena and pleadings and to go
"through the documents in the context of" the topics in the deposition notice. Id.
(alteration omitted).
91. Id. at 1210.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1210-11.
95. Id. at 1211.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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The jury returned a verdict in favor of the trust, finding that even
though Cotton had conspired unlawfully and had made material
misrepresentations on his insurance application, Lincoln had not relied
on or been damaged by the misrepresentations and had not been injured
by the conspiracy."
The district court entered judgment against
Lincoln and in favor of the trust for the $5 million death benefit, plus
$850,000 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to a Florida law that
requires an insurance company that loses an action for payment of a
benefit to pay the insured's reasonable attorney fees." Ironically, of
the $5.85 million judgment, the trust paid $2.24 million to Imperial for
the unpaid principal, interest, and fees it owed on Imperial's loans."'o
Following Norris's trial testimony, the district court expressed concern
about Norris's and Imperial's conduct, finding that Norris had been
"blatant in his failure to follow the rules" for a designated 30(b)(6)
witness, and Imperial hid behind Norris to conceal harmful facts by not
educating him on those topics.' 0 ' The district court notified the parties
that it was considering sanctions against Imperial and Norris and
invited briefing and argument on that issue.'0 2 After Lincoln and
Imperial filed briefs, and the court held a hearing on the issue of
sanctions, the court entered an order imposing sanctions against
Imperial in the amount of $850,000, finding that: (1) Imperial's selective
preparation of Norris constituted bad faith in that Norris "exhibited
deliberate ignorance to any inquiry harmful to Imperial's interests while
at the same time trying to affirmatively help the Trust and Imperial's
counsel at every opportunity"; and (2) because Imperial's conduct gave
rise to the lawsuit, Imperial (not Lincoln) should pay the insured's
attorney fees. 0 3

Imperial appealed the sanctions award, and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.' 04 First, the court held the district court was authorized to
impose sanctions sua sponte pursuant to its inherent power regardless

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1211 & n.5.
101. Id. at 1211.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1211-12. The $850,000 sanction left the main damages award in favor of
the trust intact, but inverted the award of attorney fees under Florida law to "prevent[]
Imperial from obtaining attorney's fees and costs from the party harmed by its inequitable
conduct." Id. at 1212 (alteration in original). In reality, it seems as though the court did
not want Lincoln to bear the significant costs of the insured's attorney fees under the
Florida fee-shifting statue when it was Imperial's conduct that caused Lincoln to be sued
in the first place.
104. Id.
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of whether Lincoln sought, or was entitled to seek, sanctions against
Imperial.'o
The court reaffirmed the district court's authority to
police the litigants before it, stating: "[tihe key to unlocking [the district
court's] inherent power is a finding of bad faith," and "[olnce unlocked,
the power carries with it the authority to assess attorney's fees as a
sanction for bad faith conduct.""'6
Second, the court agreed with the district court's finding that Imperial
had "selectively educated Norris and acted in bad faith in doing so."o'
The district court had found that Norris was prepared to answer
questions that were helpful to Imperial but conveniently lacked
knowledge when the questions involved information harmful to
Imperial.'o
The Eleventh Circuit agreed that Imperial's conduct
demonstrated bad faith, stating: "Preparing a designated corporate
witness with only the self-serving half of the story that is the subject of
his testimony is not an act of good faith."'
The court further held
that a contrary result would have allowed Imperial to
seize[] on the existence of the criminal investigation as an opportunity
to craft a perfect witness for its interests: one who was knowledgeable
about helpful facts and dumb about harmful ones. As the district court
pointed out, that all-too-clever behavior is not far from the longdisallowed use of the Fifth Amendment as both a sword and a
shield.no
Finally, the court rejected Imperial's argument that the $850,000
sanction violated its due process rights and was "unjust and unrelated
either to any harm caused to Lincoln or the alleged misconduct

105. Id.
106.

Id.

107. Id. at 1213.
We review a court's finding of bad faith, and the subsidiary factual findings that
go into it, only for clear error. Under clear error review, we will reverse only if
"after viewing all the evidence, we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been committed." We are not.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Moore, 763 F.3d 1265,
1268 (11th Cir. 2014)).
108. Id.
109. Id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) ("The persons designated must testify about
informatioft known or reasonably available to the organization.").
110. Sciarretta,778 F.3d at 1213 (citing United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758
(1983)) ("a court must not 'convert the privilege from the shield against compulsory selfincrimination which it was intended to be into a sword whereby a claimant asserting the
privilege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden which would otherwise
have been his'").
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committed by Imperial.""' Again, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with
the district court, finding Imperial's unlawful business practices gave
rise to the litigation and Lincoln never would have been sued in the first
place but for Imperial's misconduct.'1 2 To address that misconduct,
the district court tailored its sanctions award to shift the statutory
award of the insured's attorney fees from Lincoln (the innocent insurer)
to Imperial."1 3 Given these facts, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
district court's bad faith findings were not clearly erroneous, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the insured's attorney fees
as a sanction against Imperial, and the sanctions award was just and
sufficiently related to the harm that Imperial caused to avoid a due
process violation."
III.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

A. Whether a Bank that Collects or Attempts to Collect a Debt, Which
was in Default at the 7ime it was Acquired by the Bank, Qualifies as
a "Debt Collector" Under the FederalDebt Collections PracticesAct
In Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A.," the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's amended
complaint and held that under the plain language of the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA),"' a bank (or other entity) does not
qualify as a "debt collector" where "the bank does not regularly collect
or attempt to collect on debts 'owed or due another' and where 'the
collection of any debts' is not 'the principal purpose' of the bank's
business, even where the consumer's debt was in default at the time the

111. Id. Imperial argued that its only misconduct was its designee's testimony at
deposition and trial, and that the district court should have complied with the rules
governing civil contempt, which only allow contempt sanctions to coerce compliance with
a court order or to compensate a complainant. Id. at 1213 n.7. The Eleventh Circuit also
rejected this argument, noting that the sanctions imposed for contempt of court are not the
same as sanctions imposed under the court's inherent power to police against bad faith
conduct before it. Id.
112. Id. at 1214.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that the district court had not required Imperial
to pay Lincoln's own attorney fees, but only those fees of the trust that were shifted to
Lincoln under state law as a result of the judgment against Lincoln. Id. "In other words,
because of its misconduct Imperial was required to pay the fees of the party that had to
prevail in order for Imperial to recover on its loans." Id.
115. 797 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2015).
116. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p (2012).
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bank acquired it.""' The plaintiff (Davidson) filed the lawsuit against
Capital One in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Georgia, on behalf of himself and a putative class of similarly situated
individuals, alleging Capital One violated the FDCPA after attempting
to collect on a defaulted credit card account Capital One acquired after
the account was already in default."'
The plaintiff alleged, among
other things, Capital One's complaint falsely stated the amount of the
delinquency of Davidson's account."' After Capital One moved to
dismiss Davidson's amended complaint for failing to "plausibly allege
that Capital One was a 'debt collector' for purposes of the FDCPA,"120
the district court agreed with Capital One and held that Capital One did
not fit the statutory definition of a "debt collector" regardless of whether
Davidson's debt was in default at the time Capital One acquired the
account.121
On appeal, Davidson argued Capital One's false statements in its
complaint relating to the amount of Davidson's delinquency violated
"multiple subsections" of the FDCPA prohibiting a debt collector from

117. Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1310 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).
118. In 2012, Capital One acquired approximately $28 billion of HSBC Bank Nevada,
N.A.'s (HSBC) United States based credit card accounts. Id. at 1311. At the time of
Capital One's acquisition, more than $1 billion of these accounts, including Davidson's
account, were shown as delinquent or in default. Id.
119. Id. at 1311-12. Prior to Capital One's acquisition of the HSBC loans, HSBC had
filed a collection action against Davidson in state court in 2007 to collect on the defaulted
credit card account. Id. at 1311. HSBC and Davidson entered into a settlement
agreement, wherein Davidson agreed to pay HSBC $500 in exchange for HSBC dismissing
its collection action. Id. When Davidson failed to pay the $500 to HSBC, the state court
entered a judgment against Davidson and in favor of HSBC in amount of $500. Id.
Davidson alleged that although his account was delinquent in the amount of $1149.96, his
debt had been reduced to a $500 judgment in the HSBC litigation. Id. Davidson also
alleged that the affidavit filed by Capital One in support of its complaint was "mass
produced," "robo-signed," and "not based on the affiant's personal knowledge and contained
false statements in violation of the FDCPA." Id. at 1311-12.
120. Capital One had originally moved to dismiss Davidson's complaint pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. In response, Davidson filed an amended
complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1312. Despite
Davidson's attempt to cure his pleading deficiencies, Capital One moved to dismiss the
amended complaint, specifically arguing that "it did not qualify as a'debt collector' because
it regularly collected debts that were owed to it and not debts 'owed or due another."' Id.
121. Id. Specifically, "According to the district court, whether Davidson's debt was in
default at the time it was acquired by Capital One did not bear on whether Capital One
satisfied the statutory definition of 'debt collector.'" Id. Further, the district court
explained that "to qualify as a debt collector under the FDCPA, Capital One had to
'regularly' collect or attempt to collect on debts 'owed or due another' or the principal
purpose of Capital One's business had to be 'the collection of any debts' and Capital One
did not satisfy either requirement." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).
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using "any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in
connection with the collection of any debt."' 22 Because it was undisputed that the provisions Davidson alleged were violated by Capital One
apply "only to debt collectors," the court explained that "in order to
survive Capital One's motion to dismiss, Davidson must plead 'factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that'
Capital One is a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA and therefore liable
for the misconduct alleged."'2 3 Accordingly, the issue on appeal was
the meaning of "debt collector" under the FDCPA.1 2 4
First, the court discussed the distinction between a "debt collector" and
a "creditor."'25 Because it is well established that only debt collectors-and not creditors-are subject to the FDCPA, Davidson attempted
to categorize these two classifications according to "the default status of
the debt," arguing "if the debt was not in default when it was acquired,"
the acquiring entity is a creditor under the FDCPA, but "if the debt was
in default when it was acquired," the acquiring entity is a debt collector

122. Id. at 1313 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e). Under the FDCPA, conduct "constituting
a violation includes '[t]he false representation of. . . the character, amount, or legal status
of any debt' and '[tihe use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or
attempt to collect any debt or to obtain any information concerning a consumer.'" Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(2), 1692(10)).
123. Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The goal of the FDCPA
was "to 'eliminate abusive debt collection practices,' to ensure that 'debt collectors who
refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged,'
and to promote consistent state action in protecting consumers against debt collection
abuses." Id. at 1312-13. However, § 1692(e) applies only to debt collectors. Id. at 1313.
124. Id.
125. Id. The FDCPA defines a "debt collector" to mean "[1] any person who uses any
instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose
of which is the collection of any debts, or [2] who regularly collects or attempts to collect,
directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another." Id.
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)). The court explained that although the statute does not
define "another," the common usage of the word provides that the term "another" refers to
"one that is different from the first or present one." Id. at 1316 (quoting MERRIAMWEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 48 (10th ed. 1996)). Thus, in applying this definition
to the FDCPA's use of "another," the court concluded "a person must regularly collect or
attempt to collect debts for others in order to qualify as a 'debt collector.'" Id. A "creditor"
is "any person who offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed," but
is not one who "receives an assignment or transfer of a debt in default solely for the
purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for another." Id. at 1313 (quoting U.S.C.
§ 1692a(4)). Further, "any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any
name other than his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or
attempting to collect such debts, will be treated as a 'debt collector' for purposes of the Act."
Id. at 1313-14 (quoting U.S.C. § 1692a(6)).
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subject to the FDCPA.'2 6 Davidson relied on one of the exceptions
listed in the FDCPA for a person or entity that would typically be
considered to be a "debt collector" but is not otherwise considered to be
such under the FDCPA.1 2 7 However, the court held the exception
relied upon by Davidson is one that only applies if the person or entity
was first determined to be a "debt collector" under the "substantive
requirements" of the FDCPA.'28 The court explained that because
courts are obligated to read a statute "to give full effect to each of its
provisions," the exception relied upon by Davidson was "clearly, plainly,
and directly" 1 29 one which provides an exception to a person or entity
that would otherwise be considered to be a "debt collector" under the
FDCPA-not one "to bring entities that do not otherwise meet the
definition of 'debt collector' within the ambit of the FDCPA solely
because the debt on which they seek to collect was in default at the time
they acquired it."' The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the exclusion

126. Id. at 1314 (emphasis in original). Davidson relied on U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) to
argue that "an entity that does not originate a debt, but acquires it from another, is
deemed either a creditor or a debt collector depending on the default status of the debt at
the time it was acquired." Id. This subsection identifies certain persons or entities
excluded from the definition of the term "debt collector," including "any person collecting
or attempting to collect any debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the
extent such activity .. . (iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii).
127. Davidson, 797 F.3d at 1314.
128. Id. The Eleventh Circuit explained, "Subsection (F)(iii) [of the FDCPA] excludes
any person who is collecting or attempting to collect on any debt owed or due another from
the term 'debt collector' if the debt was not in default at the time it was acquired." Id.
Accordingly, the court reasoned the following:
The phrase is properly understood to include "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal
purpose of which is the collection of any debts" and is collecting for another, and
any person "who regularly collects or attempts to collect . .. debts owed or due or
asserted to be owed or due another" and is collecting for another.
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6)). The court further explained that
before a person can qualify as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA, and thus qualify for the
exclusions listed in section 1692a(6), he must satisfy the FDCPA's "substantive requirements" listed in the plain language of the statute. Id.
129. Id. at 1315 (quoting United States v. DBB Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir.
1999)).
130. Id. The court stated, "If we consider § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) in isolation, it is not
unreasonable to read the exclusion to intimate that any person who collects or attempts
to collect any debt owed or due another, which debt was in default at the time it was
obtained by such person, is a 'debt collector.'" Id. However, the court explained that
"when § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) is read in its statutory context, it reveals itself to be nothing more
than a single exclusion for a certain group of persons from a statutory definition that
Davidson effectively urges us to ignore." Id.
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relied upon by Davidson is just an exclusion, not a definition or a "trap
door" to those who would otherwise not fall within the ambit of the

FDCPA. 131
Next, the court addressed Davidson's attempt to qualify Capital One
as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA by alleging in his amended
complaint that Capital One "regularly acquires delinquent and defaulted
consumer debts that were originally owed to others" and "has attempted
to collect such delinquent or defaulted debts in the regular course of its
business, using the mails and telephone system."13 2 But again, the
Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the consumer and concluded that
Davidson failed to demonstrate Capital One's "principal purpose" is "debt
collection" and the allegations in Davidson's amended complaint were
insufficient to make Capital One a "debt collector" under the FDCPA.'a Accordingly, "[blecause Davidson's amended complaint does not
plausibly allege that Capital One is a 'debt collector' under the FDCPA,"
the court affirmed the dismissal.a4
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 2015 survey period yielded several noteworthy decisions, some of
which concerned issues of first impression in the Eleventh Circuit.
While the Survey is not intended to be exhaustive, the Authors have
provided material that will be useful to practitioners by selecting
relevant updates in the area of federal trial practice and procedure in
the Eleventh Circuit.

131. Id. The court explained:
Davidson cannot rely on § 1692a(6)(F)(iii) to bring entities that do not otherwise
meet the definition of "debt collector" within the ambit of the FDCPA solely
because the debt on which they seek to collect was in default at the time they
acquired it. Section 1692a(6)(F)(iii) is an exclusion; it is not a trap door.

Id.
132. Id. at 1317.
133. Id. The Court explained that Davidson's amended complaint "does not expressly
state that the 'principal purpose' of Capital One's business is debt collection, as required
by the first definition of'debt collector.'" Id. The Court further explained that although
Davidson does allege that "Capital One has attempted to collect . .. delinquent or defaulted
debts in the regular course of its business, using the mails and telephone system in doing
so," "[t]o the extent that this allegation invokes the principal purpose concept, it is
insufficient to establish Capital One's status as a 'debt collector.'" Id. (alteration in
original). Specifically, although Davidson's amended complaint "provides a basis from
which we can plausibly infer that some part of Capital One's business is debt collection,"
the amended complaint "fails to provide any basis from which we could plausibly infer that
the 'principal purpose' of Capital One's business is debt collection." Id. Accordingly, the
Court concluded, "The first definition will not sustain Davidson's action." Id.
134. Id. at 1318.

